A Thinking BUM and a Rabbi have an email exchange!

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A couple of weeks ago I got to see Rabbi David Wolpe and Christopher Hitchens debate live. I went with fellow ODer An Atheist, and another atheist blogger (not OD) that I met that night. I had an awesome time. The Rabbi had challenged the audience in a few ways, and I wrote him an email which he very promptly responded to.

Here’s the exchange:

———– BEGIN A THINKING BUM’s EMAIL —————-

———– BEGIN A THINKING BUM’s EMAIL —————-

 

Dear Rabbi Wolpe,

I had the pleasure of seeing the spirited debate in La Jolla, California between you and Christopher Hitchens. Your presentation gave me a number of things to think about that I’ve written here, and I wanted to ask for your response if you think it worth your time.

As I didn’t write this down immediately after the talk, my memory may be messing with your position somewhat, but as I understand it, you argued/challenged that "an atheist could act in a disinterestedly good way, but he doesn’t have a (rational) basis for acting this way."

This is a tricky challenge, but I think I have a response — and I’d love to hear what you think of it.

Let’s assume that I’m an atheist who comes across some wild animal that’s got himself stuck in some mud and is clearly struggling to get out.

Assuming that helping such a creature is in no way in my evolutionary interest; and by helping this creature I’m both spending my time and getting myself somewhat dirty in the process. (I think that this satisfies the general thrust of the challenge: acting good at some personal cost in a situation where no reciprocal benefit could possibly occur.)

So, I free the animal and get dirty in the process.

And, I think that I’ve got a rational reason for acting in this way: I enjoy thinking of myself as a good and virtuous person. I like being able to think back on my life and to say that "yes, I’ve consistently tried to be a good person my whole life." And as Aristotle supposedly said, "A virtuous life is its own reward."

Now, I guess, at this point you could counter that "this is only apparent disinterested goodness. You have an interest in your own wanting to think about yourself as good — clearly not disinterested."

This kind of challenge meets up with 2 difficulties that I can think of:
1. it’s unfalsifiable in a fatal way.
2. The charge would now extend to cover any theist — as any apparently disinterested action that a theist takes, the atheist could just as easily counter with "well you only did that because you want to please God (rather than your future reminiscing self in the case of the atheist)."

Perhaps one could complain that doing good things because they make you feel pleasure and satisfaction doesn’t mean that you are a moral person, but I’d submit that a person who gets satisfaction from doing cruel and vicious things to his fellow sentient beings is clearly immoral, and the kind of person that society would like to discourage. I ask, what should we call a person who gets pleasure from the doing the opposite?

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Now, there is a another problem with claiming that "faith inspires disinterested good actions."

You repeatedly denied that you and your faith had "the true" religion in the exclusive sense. Something along the lines: An infinite God has an infinite number of possible ways of being approached and understood …

I think Hitchens tried to make the following point, but I’ll try my own version because I like it better.

If religion can inspire people to do things that they wouldn’t normally do: it isn’t that religion/faith poisons everything, it’s that religion/faith somewhat randomly affects very important things — sometimes to otherwise unattainable good actions, and sometimes to otherwise unattainable evil actions.

If you accept the faith that gives people comfort, inspires disinterested good actions. How can you discount the faith of a suicide bomber or a person who honestly believes that he should kill the infidels?

The only way out that I can see is to say something like: Because their faith isn’t true. But then, is there a reliable way to discern true faith from false faith?

(Of course, "being true" isn’t enough of a guarantee that it’s moral, it’s possible that God gives people different faiths — in which they are all in some sense "true". He might use the earth as his own personal soap opera, anytime things get a bit boring he stirs things up by adding a new revelation.)

Anyway, this is getting too long…

Thanks for your time and consideration,

[A Thinking BUM]

P.S. I have a blog that I may post this e-mail to in the future. Please let me know if you would mind my posting your response on my blog if/when you respond.  Thanks!

———- RABBI RESPONDS ———–
———- RABBI RESPONDS ———–
———- RABBI RESPONDS ———–

Dear [A Thinking BUM] – Thanks for your thoughtful questions.  Feel free to post this, but without editing it, please.

I am sorry I cannot give as full a response as your questions deserve right now.  But here are the crucial points as I understand them.  As to the first, I think everyone can distinguish between disinterested and interested not in the sense that doing ‘disinterested’ goodness does not offer some satisfaction, but that a rationale for self-sacrifice makes a difference.  The reason we have concepts like sacrifice and disinterestedness is I recognize there is a moral difference between helping someone for a reward and doing it for its own sake.  And goodness for its own sake is not only statistically more significant in religious communities (who volunteer more, give more to charity etc) but makes better sense given an overarching ethic.

    As to distinguishing between belief, there are degrees.  I have faith in a moral God who, although I may not always be able to distinguish between the best manner of worship, proclaims to the world moral absolutes such as – murder of innocents is wrong.  Someone who does it in God’s name is, in my view, profoundly wrong in both action and in faith.  If you ask how I know we get back the question of religious epistemology which is fascinating, but would require more than a quick email.  In addition to my own book, I suggest a gl

ance at the writings of anyone from CS Lewis to John Hick.

All the Best,

RDW

———- END OF RABBI RESPONSE ————

Any comments on the exchange?